US POLICY IN AZERBAIJAN: A BACKWARD STRATEGY FROM FREEDOM
Richard Lee Hough: 2/11/04
A EurasiaNet commentary by Richard Lee Hough
There is a stark contrast in the Bush administration’s rhetoric on the need
to promote democratic values around the globe, and its actions. In a speech
late last year, President George W. Bush unveiled a "forward strategy for
freedom." Over subsequent months, administration officials repeatedly
expounded on that theme. Yet, the administration’s stance towards the Caucasus
country of Azerbaijan is at odds with its fanciful talk about promoting individual
liberty.
In his November 6 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush
established that "the advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is
the calling of our country." While his comments focused on the Middle
East, he made it clear that the US effort to promote democratic values would
have a global reach.
Bush did not delve into specifics of the US democratization strategy, other
than to say that the campaign would require "the same persistence, energy
and idealism that we have shown before." He stressed that US interests
would face potentially dire threats in areas, such as the Middle East, where
democracy "does not flourish." He also noted that "sixty years
of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle
East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be
purchased at the expense of liberty."
Bush’s characterization of the Middle East could also pertain to conditions
in many countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia – where the democratization
process has atrophied in recent years.
Today, the authoritarian trend in Central Asia is particularly strong.
Meanwhile, in the Caucasus there appears to be potential for the revival of the
democratization process in Georgia. At the same time, Azerbaijan appears to be
headed in the opposite direction, with the new leadership under Ilham Aliyev
heading in an authoritarian direction as it consolidates its authority. The
United States is complicit in the assault on liberty being carried out in Azerbaijan.
The trigger for the recent crackdown in Azerbaijan was the desire of
Azerbaijan’s leadership to ensure a dynastic transfer of power. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. IIham
Aliyev, son of the now deceased authoritarian ruler, Heydar Aliyev, was
"elected" president of Azerbaijan last October 15 in an election
condemned by international monitors as rigged. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Dynastic succession was accomplished in an election perverted by wholesale
fraud, intimidation, sweeping arrests of opposition leaders and activists, and
police brutality. An estimated 300 people were injured during protests against
election fraud. Close to 1,000 opposition party leaders and partisans were
jailed. A substantial number of journalists were beaten and arrested, making a
mockery of open media coverage; and roughly 100 election officials were taken
into custody for refusing to sanction the electoral fraud. Over 100 party
leaders are still in jail, with some already facing trial.
Azerbaijani authorities blame opposition leaders for the post-election
violence. Despite this claim, there can be little doubt that the violence was
state-sponsored, and designed to smash Aliyev’s political opposition. The
recent report of Human Rights Watch, "Crushing Dissent: Repression, Violence
and Azerbaijan Elections", details the government’s flagrant violations of
political and human rights. The report was based on over 200 interviews with
Azeris in 14 different cities. In response, Azerbaijani authorities have
denounced the report as biased, while being unable to disprove the substance of
the findings.
There has been a pattern of systematic repression in Azerbaijan since Heydar
Aliyev, a former top KGB official and politburo member during the Soviet era,
came to power in 1993. The elder Aliyev’s policies were calibrated to enhance
his own personal authority, rather than to promote political pluralism. His
son, Ilham, appears to be picking up where the elder Aliyev left off.
Beyond the human rights question, Azerbaijan is a country with signifgant
problems that place enormous obstacles in the path of democratization and
economic development. For example, the international organization Transparency
International ranks Azerbaijan as one of the most corrupt nations in the world.
[For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The extent of the government’s corrupt practices are underscored by a federal
court case in New York, in which a Swiss lawyer stands accused of facilitating
bribes allegedly made to senior Azeri government officials in connection with a
scheme to privatize the national oil company. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Given the well-documented rights violations and other issues, the Bush
administration’s policy towards Azerbaijan has been less than exemplary, and
inconsistent with its self-declared "forward strategy of freedom."
Whereas the circumstances appear to warrant a strong US condemnation of the
Aliyev administration’s repression, the Bush administration has been solicitous
of the new Azerbaijani president.
That the Bush Administration supports the Aliyev dynasty is clear. The signs
were numerous during the election period, including the awkward US blessing of
the marred succession process as "constitutional," and the
ill-considered phone call by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage congratulating
Aliyev on his "strong performance at the polls." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
A later State Department statement and Bush’s congratulatory letter to
Aliyev did express disappointment over the government’s election conduct. The
State Department’s release, for example, called for a "credible
transparent investigation" of election violations. But the criticisms were
belated and restrained. A strong US public statement before the election --
coordinated with similar statements from the Council of Europe and the Office
of Security and Cooperation Europe, insisting on a free and fair election --
was conspicuously absent. Many independent media outlets in Azerbaijan
accordingly characterized Aliyev as the "American candidate".
Subsequent to the Azerbaijani election, US support for Aliyev the younger
has become even more evident. Beyond the congratulatory letter from President
Bush and a friendly Ramadan message from Secretary of State Colin Powell, there
has been a steady stream of senior administration officials visiting Aliyev in
Baku, including Assistant Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe and Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld.
US statements issued during these visits have stressed the need for broader
cooperation, principally concerning Caspian Basin security. Rumsfeld announced
increased military assistance to the Aliyev government, soon evidenced by a $10
million grant to prevent "the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction."
Shortly after the election, the World Bank’s International Finance
Corporation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved
$200 million respectively of financing for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline, yet another sign of Aliyev’s acceptance by the international
community.
Such actions directly contradict the principles that Bush outlined in his
November speech. His administration’s stance toward Aliyev effectively states
that reliance on an authoritarian government in Azerbaijan’s case is the best
way to protect US interests, namely the oil that will flow through the BTC
pipeline. At the same time, the president’s policy appears to admit that
vigorous support for Wilsonian values, and for a democratic transition, is too
risky.
The main reasons why the US has embraced the Aliyev regime are self-evident:
to secure access to Caspian Sea oil while protecting US interests in BTC; and
to contain Russian influence in the Caucasus region. No doubt, the Bush
administration is also sensitive to protecting the oil companies that have
invested heavily in Caspian Sea oil exploitation.
These national interests obviously are not marginal concerns.
Decision-making requires that they be given serious consideration, recognizing
also that US power is not without limits. The core question, however, is
whether the Aliyevs are the best way to secure these interests.
Unflinching support for the Aliyev administration plainly has its faults.
Given the events surrounding Azerbaijan’s presidential election, Ilham Aliyev’s
administration is not considered legitimate by a large portion of the country’s
population. As such, a destabilization scenario in Azerbaijan is every bit as
possible as a stabilization scenario.
There is not necessarily a conflict between mindfully encouraging democratic
institutional reforms and being attentive to the dynamic of political
stability. Is the Bush administration so embedded with the Aliyev clan that a
more principled, constructive diplomacy is no longer feasible? Whatever the
answer may be to that question, the credibility of Bush’s democratization
rhetoric surely is subject to question. It has already been the object of scorn
in Azerbaijan itself.
Editor’s Note: Richard Hough, PhD, is a retired Foreign Service
Officer and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. His most recent book is
The Nation-States: Concert or Chaos.