Rosbalt,
It will not
be boring in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) this year. All the
problems that have been in the
news in 2003 - the long and unproductive
negotiations over Russia-Belarus integration, the failed Russian peacekeeping mission in Transdniestr, friction between Russia and Turkmenistan over the status
of Russians in Turkmenistan,
the uncertainty after the change
of power in Azerbaijan - have all carried
over into 2004.
However, two events require special consideration, for they could
have a decisive impact on the countries
of the former Soviet Union and
on Russia's relations with the Commonwealth.
These are the presidential elections in Georgia (already held in early January)
and in Ukraine (scheduled for the
last Sunday of October).
The revolution
in Georgia, which brought
an end to the reign of Eduard
Shevardnadze, has brought to power a much
younger politician, who will inevitably
make all manner of mistakes. The Russian media
have labeled Mikhail Saakashvili the 'Georgian Zhirinovsky,'
but this is unfair. To judge by
his initial steps as president, he seems
more like Russia's first president.
As evidence,
consider his strongly populist approach, his promise of radical change and his public declarations against corruption along with an apparent
willingness to say what people want
to hear. If you add
to this that
the Georgian people were fed
up with the
former leadership and that Saakashvili
is immensely popular, the similarity to Boris
Yeltsin becomes clearer.
Georgia's problems are such, however,
as to make impossible any quick, comprehensive resolution. It remains to be seen,
in fact, if they can be resolved at all. Faced with
such a situation, an inexperienced leader is likely to try
to achieve at least one noticeable
success, both to strengthen his own position and
to divert attention from the country's many
other problems.
As it will
be impossible to do much about corruption,
restoration of the economy is going to be a long and
difficult process. With the age-old conflicts with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia appearing to have reached
dead-end, it seems more than
likely that Georgia will attempt to
resolve the crisis with willful
Ajaria. If Georgia is successful here, the government will have demonstrated that it wields real authority.
However, success
is not a sure thing. Ajarian
leader Aslan Abashidze is a
strong politician and highly popular at home. While he
undoubtedly once nurtured ambitions to rule Georgia, he has probably set these aside. But his family has ruled Ajaria since the 16th century, and he is unlikely
to give it up without a fight.
He already has Russia's unconditional support and has always enjoyed excellent relations with Moscow.
Therein lies the main danger.
Any attempt by Tbilisi to
pressure the Ajarian leader will immediately bring Russia into
the equation. While Moscow will
have to get
involved, any political (not to mention military) Russian involvement will be harshly condemned by the
West, which has already shown where its
sympathies lie with remarks like
'Saakashvili is democracy, Abashidze is authoritarianism.' There is, in point of fact, no abundance of democracy in Ajaria, and the Georgian
leadership will bear this in mind.
Whatever happens, developments in Georgia and perhaps the whole
of the South Caucasus this year will
depend on relations between Tbilisi and Batumi.
The other place where political
tension will build this year
is Kiev. The presidential elections in Ukraine this year promise
to be a battleground between Moscow and the West for
influence over this large buffer
state that is simultaneously trying to integrate with
the EU and the proposed single
economic zone of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
The result of
the vote in Ukraine will determine
which direction Ukrainian politics takes at least until 2010. There either will be open political competition of the European kind or
there will be a post-Soviet election with the result
decided beforehand behind closed doors
and the voting
serving only to confirm what
has already been decided.
Ukrainian President
Leonid Kuchma has repeatedly said in public that he
does not intend to run for
the presidency a third time. It is obvious that the
ruling elite in Ukraine has decided to copy Russia
and prepare a successor. Some observers have suggested that the head of the
presidential administration,
Viktor Medvedchuk, could be that successor,
while others believe Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych is the best choice.
It remains clear, however, that no one has been found who
could compete with opposition leader Viktor Yuschenko,
who remains the frontrunner in the race.
So 'plan B' may
be called into play: the Ukrainian
constitutional court has already declared that Kuchma may
run again (his current term is considered his first, not his second). At the same time, parliament has overcome opposition resistance and approved a constitutional reform to make election
of the president, beginning in 2006, a matter of parliamentary rather than popular vote. Thus, if Kuchma
wins election this year (he
could decide to run by
underlining the need for continuity
during a period of change and upheaval)
he would be able to run
again later in the parliamentary republic that will
exist after 2006.
If such a scenario is being considered, Ukraine is likely to face
trouble. The opposition will probably try to
organize mass rallies like the demonstrations
of 2001 and 2002 that paraded under slogans
of a 'Ukraine without Kuchma' and 'Arise
Ukraine.' It should be borne in mind that Kuchma
has always managed to deal with
opponents and has faced even more
critical situations than this one.
But constitutional
manipulation will undoubtedly cause consternation and disapproval in the West, where Kuchma is not liked anyway. The
opposition will probably exploit these Western sympathies
but will also try to garner
direct support, as was done in Georgia and Serbia. Kuchma does, however, have the support
of Russia, and this is significant. Of course, Russia is under no illusions as to the reliability
of the fickle Kuchma as an ally. But, given the situation,
Russia will surely back Kuchma
in preference to the pro-Western
Yuschenko.
With all the attention that
Ukraine is now getting from the
European Union, there can be no doubt that a serious power struggle is about to unfold.
On one side, there are the
Russian spin doctors, expert in stage-managing elections and traditionally
supportive of Kuchma, while on the other
side there are the European
and American experts on 'velvet revolutions,' who know how to
deal with corrupt autocrats.
Fyodor Lukianov,
editor of Russia
in Global Politics, for
Rosbalt.
Translated by Nick Chesters.