TURKEY SEEKS TO CARVE OUT CONFLICT
RESOLUTION ROLE IN THE CAUCASUS
Mevlut Katik: 1/14/04
Turkish officials view the recent
leadership turnover in both Azerbaijan and Georgia as a diplomatic opportunity to promote stabilization in the strife-prone
Caucasus. In particular, Ankara wants to act as a conflict
mediator, with the aim of smoothing
the way for
pipeline construction in the region.
Many political analysts believe the Turkish initiative
stands little chance of success. They point to
Armenia’s antagonistic relationship with both Turkey and
Azerbaijan as a major stumbling block. There have been
few signs in recent months, they add, that
the historic enemies are prepared
to set aside feelings of mutual hostility in order to promote
stabilization measures, such as a lasting political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Turkey opened its diplomatic campaign in early January, when Turkish
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul paid his first
official visit to Baku since Ilham Aliyev’s election as Azerbaijani president last fall. [For background
see the Eurasia
Insight archive]. Azerbaijan, which has strong cultural links to Turkey,
is Ankara’s staunchest ally in the Caucasus.
While Gul’s talks with Azerbaijani
officials spanned a wide variety of economic and political
issues, the topic of regional security clearly dominated the meetings.
Gul mentioned repeatedly that Turkey sought to
increase its role in the Karabakh peace
process. Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are currently stalemated.
[For background
see the Eurasia
Insight archive].
"We are working on producing solutions [to the
Karabakh issue] by bringing together
the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkish foreign ministers," Gul said at a joint news conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Vilayat Quliyev. Gul went
on to say that a "trilateral meeting" would be convened at an unspecified future date.
Turkish and Azerbaijani officials also discussed Baku’s potential membership in NATO. Turkey is scheduled to host
the upcoming NATO summit in June.
Turkey’s recent conflict-settlement efforts are reportedly
not limited to Azerbaijan. According to a January 10 report in the Turkish
daily Hurriyet, Ankara is also trying to
position itself as a go-between in Georgia, seeking to ease
tension between the new government
in Tbilisi and the autonomy-minded
region of Ajaria. [For background
see the Eurasia
Insight archive].
Ankara’s eagerness to improve the
security climate in the Caucasus is clearly driven by a desire to
keep the construction timetable for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline on track. [For background
see the Eurasia
Insight archive]. In Baku, Gul and
Quliyev both expressed hope that pipeline construction
would be completed in 2005,
as planned. "The Caucasus retains its strategic importance
as an East-West energy and transportation corridor, and as a door for
Turkey to Central Asia," Gul stated during
a speech at Baku State University.
Upheaval in Georgia in late
2003 -- namely the rigged November election that sparked
popular protests, culminating
in former president Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation – initially raised concerns about potential BTC construction delays. [For background
see the Eurasia
Insight archive]. Those concerns have eased in recent
weeks, especially after the January
4 special presidential election, won by
Mikheil Saakashvili, passed without prompting fresh unrest. [For additional
information see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
Saakashvili has repeatedly
stated that his administration will be committed to the
BTC project and will seek to
foster closer ties with Turkey.
"The important thing is to increase
our economic cooperation," Turkey’s NTV television channel quoted Saakashvili as saying January 9. "We [in Georgia] are planning significant tax rebates for
small and medium-sized businesses.
In this way,
Turkish capital will be able to
come here and enter new fields
of business."
While bilateral Turkish-Georgian relations may be poised for a breakthrough,
prospects for significant improvement in the Caucasus’ overall
security climate appear uncertain. For all the
talk about wanting to foster a Karabakh
settlement, Gul gave no indication that Ankara would make a policy shift
that could facilitate peace talks.
At present, Turkey’s ability to promote
the Karabakh peace process would
seem limited, given that Ankara does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Armenia. Gul stressed
that back-channels of bilateral communication have opened in recent years. Yet, Turkish-Armenian relations remain strained over the highly
contentious Armenian Genocide debate, as Ankara steadfastly refuses to recognize that
the mass deaths of Armenians in eastern Turkey during World War
I were the result of well-coordinated Turkish government action.
Some Azerbaijani observers have speculated that Turkey’s desire to gain admission
to the European
Union could put pressure on Turkish officials to normalize
relations with Armenia. However, Gul ruled out
the possibility of Ankara making a good-will
gesture in the near future, such
as opening Turkey’s border with Armenia.
Indeed, he stated in Baku that the border’s reopening
would be conditional on the negotiation of a lasting political settlement for Karabakh.
Turkey’s room for maneuver is limited to a certain
extent by Ankara’s desire not to upset the
special relationship with Azerbaijan. Turkey has provided firm support for
Azerbaijan’s negotiating position; that Karabakh be granted broad autonomous authority while remaining part of Azerbaijan. Recent statements by Azerbaijani
officials indicate that Baku is skittish about any potential
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. "If Turkey makes even
a minor move towards Armenia, it may harm both
Azerbaijan’s and its [Turkey’s] own national interests,"
Quliyev, the Azerbaijani foreign minister, told ANS TV in Baku on January 10.
Quliyev himself has given no indication of late that the
Azerbaijani government is prepared to engage
Armenia. During the ANS interview, for example, he
complained that "Armenia is constantly keeping the fictitious
genocide issue on the agenda." Such comments are
sure to antagonize Yerevan.
Following his talks in Azerbaijan, Gul traveled to Iran, where his discussions also concentrated on security. The Turkish
foreign minister pressed for an Iranian commitment to contain possible
Kurdish radical activity on Iranian soil, especially that carried out
by the PKK. [For background
see the Eurasia
Insight archive]. Iranian leaders, however, reportedly made no promise that they would
expand cooperation with Ankara on Kurdish issues.
"Gul did not get the answer
he expected from Iran following his demand that Tehran
declare the PKK a terrorist organization," said a commentary published January 11 by the Turkish
newspaper Daily Milliyet.
Editor’s Note:
Mevlut Katik is a London-based journalist
and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and also worked for
The Economist group.