Rosbalt, 02/03/2004, 12:03

The Kurds Are Counting on Russia

 

Interview by Yana Amelina, Rosbalt, Moscow

Translated by Howard Goldfinger

 

What can Russia expect from the Kurds? In an exclusive interview with Rosbalt, Mekhimed Eshiyok, a member of the executive committee of the Kurdistan People's Congress and its representative to the Commonwealth of Independent States, shares his views of the developing situation.

 

After Turkey's special services arrested Abdullah Odzhalan, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (RPK), which he headed, first became the Kurdistan Congress of Freedom and Democracy (KSDK) and then, quite recently, the Kurdistan People's Congress (NKK). Are these strictly organizational changes or do they reflect ideological changes in the Kurdish movement?

This was certainly not a mere formality. The 21st century-the epoch of globalization-puts democratic criteria first. If we stand outside the world system, we will be unable to conduct ourselves successfully. The 40-million-strong Kurdish people has been, till now, ignored and largely persecuted by the governments of the countries in which it has lived. The aim and task of the NKK is a democratic resolution of the Kurdish question in four countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria) through reform of their theocratic and autocratic regimes. There is no place in the new, global world for national governments founded on a basis of religion and nationalism, as in Iran and Turkey.

The structure of the old RPK reflected the reality of a world in which two military-political blocs opposed each other but it could not meet the needs of the present. The change in the party will allow the Kurdish people to express themselves in the new conditions. The People's Congress is open to everyone. Our aim is to lead the Kurdish people into the front ranks of those struggling for the democratization of the Middle East.

Are you saying that the NKK has become a democratic party of the European type?

I would go so far as to say that the People's Congress has gone beyond the usual European standards.

But the traditional Moslem social order, to which most Kurds adhere, is thought to be hardly receptive to the development and strengthening of democracy. Do you agree with that?

Yes, we recognize these difficulties. However, it will be fully possible to develop democracy in the Middle East when the legacy of feudalism and patriarchy, which is where fundamentalism has its roots, is overcome. One must not look at this vast region as cut off from the rest of the world. And Kurdistan is its center. We believe in our strengths and our potential to overcome the leftovers of the past.

We have encountered many difficulties in the course of our history, and without the help of the rest of the world, we will find things harder, especially because of the forces in the region that seek to defend the status quo. But the world has shrunk greatly in this age of globalization and the Internet, and we are confident that the democratic Kurdish movement will find support in the rest of the world.

Winding up the topic of democracy, can you say when, approximately, it will come to the Middle East?

The Kurdish people are seeking to realize it in their daily lives. Overall, democratization of the region will take a long time and much effort.

In your view, what are the chances of implementing the 'Road Map' put forward by the KSDK as the way to solve the Kurdish problem?


Background: The 'Road Map,' with its listing of specific proposals, is based on last fall's analogous plan for the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli crisis. Originally, a deadline of September 1, 2004, was set for implementation. It is clear now that the date will have to be moved back substantially. The first phase of the process envisages the government of Turkey and the leaders of the Kurds agreeing to end hostilities. Ankara would rapidly end its military operations and deportations of civilians, remove its special-designation police and military from Kurdistan and carry out a number of other similar measures. The KSDK and Kurdish guerrillas would end all military activity, refrain from all 'anti-government and militaristic propaganda' and would organize demonstrations and meetings 'exclusively within the framework of democratic principles.' None of this, it should be noted, has as yet taken place.

The second phase calls for specific steps designed to build trust between the sides. Ankara would remove its ban on discussions of the Kurdish problem, adopt a law for the full rehabilitation and restoration of rights of guerrillas, political prisoners and political emigrants, would improve the conditions under which Abdullah Odzhalan is held, would assist the start of economic growth in Kurdistan and would make official apologies to the Kurdish people for ignoring its problems and for its use of force. The Kurds promised to turn in their arms and ammunition, return to Turkey 'from the hills and from emigration' in groups of 500, refrain from anti-government activity and create a 'Committee of Justice, Amnesty and the Establishment of Truth' to expose crimes committed by members of the KSDK.

Finally, the third phase of the plan would bring a full, democratic resolution of the Kurdish problem, including the signing of a treaty of peace and concord with Turkey. The Constitution would be amended to recognize the Kurds as an independent nation enjoying equal rights and with wide authority in governing their own democratic republic. Development of the Kurdish language, culture, press, broadcasting and Kurdish-language schools would be constitutionally protected. Then Abdullah Odzhalan would be freed, and no barriers would be placed in the way of his political activity 'aiming for the fraternal union of the Kurdish and Turkish peoples.' For their part, the Kurds accepted responsibility 'to defend the interests of democratic Turkey.' Ankara has not officially responded to the Kurdish proposals, but there have been some makeshift reforms-for example, in some places school instruction in Kurdish has been allowed.


We will continue to insist on the demands laid out in the 'Road Map.' One of the main recent changes in the region has been the expansion of the US in Iraq. This is another proof that the political forces opposed to the Kurds-whether the theocracy of Iran or the Turkish oligarchy-will suffer the same fate as the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish people are the most dynamic and most regionally reform-oriented element in the area, having learned from our history of persecution.

Our aim is to achieve the rights that all peoples have and to do so within the framework of existing borders, while solidifying our rights under the constitutions of the countries in which we live. We have no aim to break up any country. The Kurds support the democratic, federal model of the new Iraq. It is a multinational country, and only that model can guarantee the protection of the rights of the various peoples that make up such a country. And, although Iran, Syria and Turkey have come out against Kurdish autonomy, they can no longer ignore the Kurdish factor.

What part of the 'Road Map' do you consider the most difficult to achieve?

You mustn't think of the Kurdish question merely as part of a regional agenda-it is a world question. The main condition set by the Kurds is freeing our national leader, Abdullah Odzhalan. In general, our demands are substantially democratic ones. The question is really about the mind-set of our opponents. When that changes, I don't think any part of the 'Road Map' is unrealizable. One mustn't forget the external forces that look at the Kurdish factor as their trump card.

Do the Kurds want territorial autonomy?

At present, the Kurdish People's Congress has not set that as a goal, but we do not oppose, for example, the form of self-definition that the Kurds in Iraq have received.

[During negotiations at the end of January between Turkish Prime Minister Redzhep Erdogan and US President George Bush, the latter declared that the United States does not support the idea of greater autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq and declared in favor of 'a peaceful, democratic Iraq with unchanged borders,' wire services reported. On the eve of his visit to Washington, Erdogan, whose government calls the Kurds 'Islamists and reactionary,' more than once told journalists that he intended to warn the White House about plans for the federalization of Iraq and widened autonomy for the Kurds. One can understand the prime minister-for if such plans are put into effect, Turkey and other countries with large Kurdish populations will inevitably witness a rise in Kurdish self-consciousness and an increase in the Kurdish struggle for their rights. With Washington's support, Ankara could significantly increase the difficulty of realizing Kurdish autonomy.-Ya. A.]

We know the Kurds have conducted a protracted armed struggle for their rights in Turkey. Are you still going to rely on force?

The Kurdish question is most contentious in Turkey, which has the largest concentration of Kurds. If the Kurdish problem is moving toward resolution in Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan, it is most certainly not in Northern (Turkish) Kurdistan. Abdullah Odzhalan's plan, which is reflected in the 'Road Map,' is the ideal scenario for Turkey. In fact, we have been striving in 15 years of armed struggle for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question.

Our guerrilla detachments still exist. They have not been demobilized. We are not conducting major military operations, but local clashes between our units and Turkish troops are continuing as in the past. We retain the right to strike without warning if force is used against our people or against Abdul Odzhalan. The Kurdish question is still being ignored and, if a democratic resolution isn't achieved, we will have no choice but to continue armed struggle. Don't forget that the route of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline runs through Kurdistan. Unless the Kurdish question is settled, no political force can guarantee the security of the pipeline.

You are ready to use the pipeline as a lever to gain your ends?

If the Kurdish question is not settled, armed action could be taken against the pipeline.

It's now been five years that Abdullah Odzhalan has been in a Turkish prison. Does he remain, in fact, the real national leader or has he become something like what a portrait of Lenin is to orthodox Communists?

Adullah Odzhalan was elected president of the People's Congress at its last convention. One mustn't look upon him merely as the leader of a party. He is the national leader of the whole Kurdish people. The recent changes in our organizational and political structure were made on the basis of suggestions from him. His intellect has revived the Kurdish people, and it is a mind held in appropriate regard. His activity is by no means merely symbolic. He continues to defend the rights of the Kurdish people even in prison. One's stance with respect to our leader is the equivalent of one's stance toward the entire Kurdish people.

It's estimated that some 400,000-500,000 Kurds live in Russia. What is the object of your mission in our country?

We have always considered Russia the nation nearest to and most friendly to the Kurds. Our aim is to develop this kind of relationship further. The NKK maintains contact with the Kurds of Russia as permitted by Russian law. Kurdish representatives face no discrimination in any sphere in Russia, for which we are very grateful to the Russian authorities. This relationship with the Kurds should be a model for the other governments of the world.

Russia should more firmly stand up for its interests in the Middle East, which will foster our closeness in strategic terms, in that relations with the Kurds will strengthen Russia's position in the region, now controlled by the Americans. We understand perfectly Russia's enormous importance in world politics and its ability to raise the Kurdish question on all levels. This is what we expect from all our friends. The Kurds are open to and ready for such cooperation.

Are you sensing positive movement in your direction from Russia?

We regret the role Russia played in what happened to Abdullah Odzhalan [Moscow refused him political asylum and, essentially, forced him out of Russia at a time when Turkish special forces were on his trail, and thus abetted the eventual arrest of Odzhalan.-Ya. A.], regret that it failed to prevent events developing as they did. But much of that depended on the balance of forces at that time. If Russia had a clear political and economic will at that time, she would not have let that happen. Today Russia can make an effort toward freeing our national leader or easing the conditions of his confinement.

Is Russia capable of influencing Turkey, specifically in the direction of a just settlement of the Kurdish question?

Certainly. Turkey is conducting an open struggle against Russia in many political and economic spheres. It should be enough to mention the limitations placed on Russian shipping passing through the Turkish-controlled Dardanelles [a number of analysts have predicted that Turkey will close the Straits, which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, to Russian oil once the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is open, which is expected next year.-Ya. A.], the controversy about the 'blue flow,' when Turkey suddenly demanded a virtual 50% cut in the price of its imports of Russian gas, the quasi-legal activity in Russia of Turkish Islamists and pan-Turkish organizations propagandizing for the idea of a Greater Turkey. . .

However, there is a whole range of international legal instrumentalities that can be used to wake Turkey up. Despite the US taking for itself responsibility for setting the 'Iraqi' part of the Kurdish question, Washington has only a tactical interest in the Kurds, while for Russia the Kurds are of strategic interest. Russia has gone through a difficult time since the collapse of its former system. We relate with understanding to its policy in the Middle East, and we believe that it is developing positively. And we stand always ready to raise Russian-Kurdish relations to a new level.

 

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